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Notes
THE ARRIVAL OF DIVISIBLE DIVORCE
IN PENNSYLVANIA
Stambaugh v. Stambaugh, 222 Pa. Super. 360, 294 A.2d 817 (1972).
In Stambaugh v. Stambaugh' the Superior Court of Pennsyl-
vania held in a four-to-three decision that "a departure from a
home to take up residency in another state, even though sufficient
to obtain divorce, cannot be utilized to defeat an existing valid
right to support."' 2 In so ruling, the court reversed a lower court
decree which had denied an appellant wife alimony pendente lite
of $450 per week and permanent alimony of $375 per week pur-
suant to a decree for divorce a mensa et thoro.3 The court indi-
cated, however, that whereas a survival of support rights will
henceforth obtain in the face of a valid divorce granted by a sister
state,4 a divorce granted by a Pennsylvania court will continue to
operate as a termination of all rights incident to marriage.5
1. 222 Pa. Super. 360, 294 A.2d 817 (1972).
2. Id. at 365, 294 A.2d at 819-20. The dissent bases its opinion on
the fact that "[lit is the settled law in Pennsylvania . . . that a divorce
a v.m., validly granted in a sister state, terminates a wife's right to sup-
port." Id. at 365, 294 A.2d at 820. The dissent also gives recognition to
the view that legislative action is necessary to preserve support orders after
ex parte divorces from the bonds of matrimony issued by a sister state.
Id. at 367, 294 A.2d at 821, citing 3 A. FREEDMAN & N. FREDMAN, LAW OF
MARRIAGE AN DIvoRcE IN PENNSYLVANIA 1432 (2d ed. 1957) [hereinafter
cited as FP~mAN].
3. A divorce a mensa et thoro [hereinafter cited as a divorce a
m.e.t.], is a divorce from bed and board.
4. 222 Pa. Super. 360, 363, 294 A.2d 817, 819 (1972).
5. Id. at 364, 294 A.2d at 819.
In so holding, Stambaugh appears at long last to be adopting
for Pennsylvania the doctrine of "divisible divorce," which was
foreshadowed in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in
Esenwein v. Pennsylvania6 and announced by the United States
Supreme Court in Estin v. Estin.7 Esenwein, which until the de-
cision in Stambaugh provided the foundation for Pennsylvania's
refusal to allow support rights to survive divorce a vinculo matri-
monii,8 involved litigation between a husband and wife who had
been married in Pennsylvania in 1899. A support order was
granted the wife in 1919. Following his procurement of a Nevada
divorce in 1941, the husband petitioned the Pennsylvania courts for
termination of the order of support. His petition was denied, not
on the basis that the support decree survived the divorce, but on
the ground that his wife had met her burden of impeaching the
foundation of the Nevada decree by showing that the husband had
not established bona fide domicile in the divorce granting stateY
The holding of the Pennsylvania court was sustained by the United
States Supreme Court.'" The Court noted that although the full
faith and credit clause of the Constitution" required that prima
facie validity be accorded the Nevada judgment, the record war-
ranted the finding of lack of domiciliary intent on the part of the
husband and consequent lack of Nevada jurisdiction. 12 In a con-
curring opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas stressed the basic difference
between the question of marital status and the question of sup-
port.'8 He noted that an accommodation of the conflicting inter-
ests of the various states would require each jurisdiction to recog-
nize a validly granted foreign divorce decree, 14 since the marital
capacity of a party to a divorce would often be in doubt if a valid
foreign divorce were not granted full faith and credit.15 However,
Mr. Justice Douglas also observed that such a conflict is not nec-
essarily present in the issue of support, since "if he is required to
6. 325 U.S. 279, 282 (1944) (concurring opinion).
7. 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
8. A divorce a vinculo matrimonii [hereinafter cited as a divorce
a v.m. ] is a divorce from the bonds of marriage.
9. Commonwealth v. Esenwein, 348 Pa. 455, 458, 35 A.2d 335, 336
(1944).
10. 325 U.S. 279, 281 (1944).
11. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
12. 325 U.S. 279, 281 (1944).
13. Id. at 282 (concurring opinion).
14. Although "foreign divorce" bears the connotation of a decree
from another country, it will be used in this Note exclusively to designate
a divorce granted by a sister state, since it appears to be the phrase most
commonly employed in that context. The problem is discussed in Lindey,
Foreign Divorce: Where Do We Go From Here?, 17 U. Prrr. L. REv. 125, 129
(1956). There the writer notes the unsatisfactory quality of "out-of-state"
and "sister state," since their connotations prevent their being employed in
connection with divorces granted by territories and possessions of the
United States. "Migratory" is found to be equally unsatisfactory, since it
"evokes an image of birds and beasts seeking gentler climes." Id.
15. 325 U.S. 279, 282 (1944) (concurring opinion).
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support his former wife, he is not made a bigamist and the off-
spring of his second marriage are not bastardized."'1 6
In Estin v. Estin,17 whose doctrine of divisble divorce Stam-
baugh appears to adopt, the Supreme Court faced the issue of
whether a valid New York support order would survive a valid
Nevada divorce decreed ex parte. After noting that the New York
courts have held that a support order could survive divorce, 8 the
Court established the principle that the incidents of marital status,
such as support, are separable from the marital status itself.'9 Ac-
cordingly, although a state is under constitutional obligation to
give full faith and credit to a valid foreign ex parte decree, it is not
obligated to recognize a foreign divorce order insofar as it pur-
ports to affect the incidents of maintenance previously established
by a local court. 20 Of course, if instead of being ex parte, the fore-
ign proceeding is one in which the divorced spouse made an ap-
16. Id. at 282-83 (concurring opinion).
17. 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
18. The Court observed in Estin that neither statute nor common law
in New York had bestowed upon the courts of that state the power to
compel a man to support his ex-wife. Indeed, the law of New York ap-
peared to be that alimony was payable only so long as the relation of
husband and wife existed so that a support order would not seem to sur-
vive a decree of absolute divorce. Nevertheless, the Court found that:
[TI he highest court in New York has held in this case that a sup-
port order can survive divorce and that this one has survived
petitioner's divorce. That conclusion is binding on us .... It is
not for us to say whether that ruling squares with what the New
York courts said on earlier occasions. It is enough that New York
today says that such is her policy.
334 U.S. 541, 544 (1948).
19. Id. at 545.
20. Id. at 549. It should be noted that full faith and credit must be
accorded divorce decrees insofar as they nullify a marital union if, but
only if, one of the parties to the action is domiciled in the state granting
the decree. This principle was announced by the United States Supreme
Court in Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) [hereinafter cited
as Williams I]. In a later appeal of the same case, the Supreme Court
held that the state which is requested to recognize the validity of a foreign
decree may decide for itself whether one of the spouses possessed a bona
fide domicile in the decree granting state. If it is found that neither party
was a good faith domiciliary of the foreign state, the local jurisdiction need
not recognize the decree. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945)
[hereinafter cited as Williams II]. Prior to Williams I, the states were
free to refuse recognition to ex parte foreign divorce decrees. This state
discretion had been substantiated by Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562
(1906), which Williams I overruled. Pennsylvania was one of the few states
still refusing to recognize ex parte foreign decrees at the time Williams I
was announced. It is suggested that this refusal was motivated to a con-
siderable extent by a desire to protect the support rights of Pennsylvania
domiciliaries, since until Stambaugh Pennsylvania has regarded such rights
as automatically terminated by a divorce a v.m.
pearance of if the spouse was personally served within the foreign
jurisdiction, the decree would be determinative of both marital
status and any support status which the dependent spouse might
have enjoyed prior to the granting of the foreign decree.
21  It
must be noted that Estin did not guarantee that support rights
previously arising in a local jurisdiction would survive a foreign
dissolution of the bonds of marriage. Rather, Estin held that the
ex parte foreign decree would not deprive her of the maintenance
rights only if the particular jurisdiction in which they had been
granted allowed such rights to survive a divorce av.m.22
In response to the "divisible divorce" holding in Estin, a num-
ber of states took measures to assure that their domiciliaries
would be accorded the same benefits enjoyed by domiciliaries of
states such as New York, which allowed the survival of such sup-
port rights.23 In several jurisdictions the provision was made by
statute.2 4 In others the courts have permitted support rights to
survive even absent statutory provisions. 25 Prior to Stambaugh,
however, the courts of Pennsylvania had refused to consider the
possibility that a support decree granted in connection with a di-
vorce am.e.t. could survive an ex parte foreign divorce av.m. In-
deed, the courts of Pennsylvania appear to have cited Estin on
only four occasions prior to Stambaugh.26 Prior to 1972 there was
a period of twenty-three years during which the Pennsylvania
appellate courts neither referred to nor distinguished Estin in any
of the divorce-support appeals coming before them.27
21. Even Pennsylvania, despite its refusal to recognize ex parte for-
eign decrees before Williams I, has traditionally recognized that full faith
and credit must be given to a foreign determination of both marital status
and support rights if the spouse domiciled in Pennsylvania submitted her-
self to the jurisdiction of the sister state. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Parker, 59 Pa. Super. 74 (1915).
22. 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948).
23. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
24. E.g., N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:34-23 (1972); ORE. Rv. STAT. § 107.310
(1971). The latter statute changed Oregon law so that the doctrine of
divisible divorce would no longer be denied application in that state. An
earlier state supreme court decision had held that the results of Estin did
not obtain in Oregon. Rodda v. Rodda, 185 Ore. 140, 200 P.2d 616 (1948),
cert. denied, 337 U.S. 946 (1949).
25. E.g., Armstrong v. Armstrong, 162 Ohio 406, 123 N.E.2d 267 (1954),
aff'd, 350 U.S. 568 (1956).
26. Commonwealth v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 400 Pa. 337, 343,
162 A.2d 817, 820 (1960); Moser v. Grandquist, 362 Pa. 302, 309, 66 A.2d
267, 270 (1949); Commonwealth v. McCormack, 164 Pa. Super. 553, 557, 67
A.2d 603, 605 (1949); Commonwealth v. Bowser, 163 Pa. Super. 494, 497, 63
A.2d 117, 119 (1949).
27. The most recent reference to Estin in a Pennsylvania decision be-
fore Stambaugh occurred in 1949 in Commonwealth v. McCormack, 164 Pa.
Super. 553, 557, 67 A.2d 603, 605 (1949). McCormack concerned the effect
of an ex parte Alabama divorce on an order of support of the wife and
child. Noting the "well settled" law of Pennsylvania that a valid divorce
decree terminates the duty of a husband to support his wife, the Superior
Court proceeded to find that the man had been validly domiciled in Ala-
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The reluctance of the Pennsylvania courts to allow a support
order to survive the granting of a divorce av.m. can be best un-
derstood by an examination of the medieval English antecedents
of the current Pennsylvania support decrees. The American prac-
tice of granting alimony as an incident to divorce was borrowed
from the ecclesiastical law, which persisted in England until the
reform of that country's court system in 1857.28 Since the church
viewed marriage as a relationship which could not be dissolved by
human authority, divorce av.m. was forbidden by ecclesiastical
policy. In certain specified instances such as adultery or cruelty
to the extent that cohabitation was rendered unsafe, the "inno-
cent" party was granted the right to live apart from the errant
spouse. This right was provided by a decree of separation, a di-
vorce am.e.t.29 Such a decree did not dissolve the marital tie,
however, so that the parties continued in their status as husband
and wife.3 0 On occasion an English spouse was provided with ali-
mony in connection with a decree of divorce av.m. even before
the reforms of 1857, but such provisions were an incident of par-
liamentary divorce, and it was the ecclesiastical rather than the
parliamentary policy which has set the pattern for Pennsylvania
law.
81
bama and therefore upheld the termination of the support order concerning
his wife. Id. at 557, 67 A.2d at 605. In an almost parenthetical manner the
court referred to Estin as not controlling in Pennsylvania. Id. The bases
on which McCormack is predicated were questioned in Packel, The Right
to Support After An Ex Parte Divorce, 29 PA. B.A.Q. 29, 32 (1957). The
writer of that Note is the writer of the opinion in Stambaugh.
28. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIc RELATIONS 420 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as CLARK].
29. 3 FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 795. The divorce law of Pennsyl-
vania currently provides that the following actions on the part of the hus-
band constitute grounds for the wife's procurement of bed and board di-
vorce: malicious abandonment of his family, maliciously turning his wife
out of doors, cruel and barbarous treatment which endangers her life, such
indignities to her person as to render her condition intolerable and her life
burdensome, and adultery. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 11 (1955). There are
no provisions for maintenance of the action by the husband.
30. 3 FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 794. This is still the Pennsylvania
position. See, e.g., Rudolph's Estate, 128 Pa. Super. 459, 462 (1937).
A divorce a mensa et thoro is a judicial separation ... it is a sepa-
ration which is not final; and it does not put it out of the power of
the husband and wife to effect a reconciliation .... [lilt merely
suspends certain mutual rights and obligations of the parties defi-
nitely or for a limited time.
Id. at 462.
31. See CLARK, supra note 30, at 420. Even in Pennsylvania alimony
was allowed as a right with a decree of divorce a v.m. from 1854 to 1895
and in certain circumstances where the court deemed it just and proper
from 1895 to 1925. Hooks v. Hooks, 123 Pa. Super. 507, 510-12, 187 A. 245,
246-47 (1936). PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 1-69 (1955), officially known as
Examined in terms of its historical development there is a cer-
tain logic to the traditional Pennsylvania position. The right to
support is held to exist wherever the marital status exists and
continues. Since divorce am.e.t. perpetuates the marital status,
despite its barring of cohabitation, the obligation of the husband
to support the wife is enforced. On the other hand, since the pur-
pose of divorce av.m. is to nullify the marital status, the granting
of alimony following a divorce from the bonds of matrimony
would be anomalous. However, with contemporary mores so dras-
tically different from those which prevailed when the ecclesiastical
laws were devised, the Pennsylvania policy of denying support fol-
lowing absolute divorce has come under increasing attack. The
criticism is exemplified by the observation of the Third Circuit in
Dixon v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
3 2
The law givers of Pennsylvania have refused to advance a
step beyond the medieval notion of alimony as an incident
of limited divorce .... At the same time they have rec-
ognized the modern concept of absolute divorce. But no
matter how great the wickedness of the husband-be he
bigamist, bully, philanderer or worse, see 23 PS. § 10-his
innocent wife must risk the poorhouse to be rid of him....
We may say that this rather unchivalrous anomaly is
unique among the . . . states. . ...3
In addition to reliance upon the centuries old traditions deny-
ing maintenance after divorce av.m., the Pennsylvania courts prior
to Stambaugh attempted to solidify this result with a somewhat
dubious application of the full faith and credit clause of the Con-
stitution.3 4 For example, in 1967 when the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held3 5 that a wife who had been divorced by her husband
in an ex parte Nevada proceeding possessed no right to election
against her husband's will,36 the court spoke as though any other
holding were rendered impossible by the full faith and credit
clause. "Greatly as we desire to protect the citizens of Pennsyl-
vania from foreign divorces, we cannot evade or circumvent the
Constitution of the United States. . . To hold otherwise ...
would make the Full Faith and Credit Clause . . . an empty and
... meaningless provision.137 The unsoundness of this position be-
comes patent in the face of Estin, wherein the Court specifically
"The Divorce Law," made no provision for such support, thus causing
Pennsylvania to revert to her traditional stance of providing alimony only
with divorce a m.e.t. The only apparent exception to the policy of not al-
lowing alimony following a divorce a v.m. is in the case of a respondent
who is insane, for whom permanent support may be decreed. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23, § 45 (1955).
32. 109 F.2d 984 (3d Cir. 1940).
33. Id. at 986.
34. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
35. In re Estate of March, 426 Pa. 364, 231 A.2d 168 (1967).




held that although a valid foreign divorce decree was entitled to
full faith and credit insofar as it affected marital status, it was
not effective on the issue of alimony. 38 Furthermore, Pennsyl-
vania seems to have obscured the double edge of the full faith and
credit clause. Although a home state must recognize those foreign
holdings which are predicated on proper jurisdiction, foreign states
in turn must refrain from adjudicating rights over which jurisdic-
tion has been retained by the home state.3 9 Even before Estin,
the Ninth Circuit had held in Bassett v. Bassett4" that a federal
district court sitting in Nevada must give full faith and credit to
all existing New York judgments for maintenance under a sepa-
rate New York support decree, although the husband had obtained
a Nevada divorce from the wife.41 The Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reasoned that the New York court had obtained jurisdiction
over both parties in the maintenance action and had, by New York
law, retained jurisdiction over the support question.
42
The result of the Pennsylvania courts' application of the full
faith and credit clause was to obscure the due process considera-
tions inherent in an ex parte adjudication of the right to support
of a non-appearing party. Since the landmark case of Pennoyer
v. Neff,43 it has been clear that where a suit is brought to deter-
mine a party's personal rights, i.e., where the litigation is con-
cerned solely with a right in personam, substituted service by
publication or in any other authorized form is ineffectual for any
purpose.44 However, where the action is in the nature of a pro-
ceeding in rem, substituted service on non-residents is sufficient. 45
Accordingly, any proceeding to determine the private personal
rights of a party cannot be in accord with the due process of law
unless the party is brought within the jurisdiction by service
within the state or by his voluntary appearance.
The correct manner of applying the in rem-in personam anal-
ysis to divorce proceedings was at one time much debated. 46 How-
ever, in recent times, divorce has been viewed as neither a strictly
in rem nor a strictly in personam proceeding. 47 As stated in
Williams I,
38. 334 U.S. 541, 549 (1948).
39. Id.
40. 141 F.2d 954 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 718 (1944).
41. Id. at 956.
42. Id. at 955.
43. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
44. Id. at 727.
45. Id.
46. 3 FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 782.
47. Id.
The . . . view that a proceeding for a divorce was . .. in
rem . .. was rejected by the Haddock case .... Such a
suit, however, is not a mere in personam action. Domicil
of the plaintiff, immaterial to jurisdiction in a personal ac-
tion, is ... essential in order to give the court jurisdiction
which will entitle the divorce decree to extraterritorial ef-
fect .... 48
Thus, divorce may best be analyzed as a quasi in rem action.
There have been occasions on which the Pennsylvania courts have
distinguished between the in rem character of the divorce decree
and the in personam nature of the alimony decree.49 Similarly, it
has been noted in Pennsylvania that since the alimony decree is
in personam and rests upon a completely different foundation from
that of the divorce order, the awarding of alimony is "a separate
order . . . severable from the decree of divorce."'50 Nevertheless,
the Pennsylvania courts have failed to investigate fully the signifi-
cance of the due process guarantee for the support rights of a
spouse. Until Stambaugh the Pennsylvania position seemed to
be that no rights survive a divorce av.m., and if none survive
there is nothing to protect constitutionally." Even in Stambaugh,
where Pennsylvania appears to be coming into line with other
states on the question of survival of support rights, there is no
recognition of possible due process underpinnings of the decision.
The neglect of the due process question by Stambaugh and
prior Pennsylvania cases dealing with foreign divorce stands in
contrast to the emphasis placed upon this question by certain
other jurisdictions in their handling of the foreign divorce-support
decree question. For example, the Supreme Court of California
has held that "the due process clause forbids the divorce court to
adjudicate the absent wife's right to support" 52 so that a foreign
48. 317 U.S. 287, 297 (1942).
49. See, e.g., Grimm v. Grimm, 42 C. 685, 689, 24 Dist. 90, 93 (Pa.
1914). The holding in Grimm was that a decree of divorce with permanent
alimony made in another state against one who at the time was a resident
of Pennsylvania is a nullity beyond the limits of the other state and there
can be no action on the resident of Pennsylvania to recover from him
arrearages in alimony, even though his remarriage estopped him from
denying the validity of the decree of divorce. Grimm was, of course, de-
cided in the days before Williams I, which compelled Pennsylvania and
the other states to accord full faith and credit to foreign divorces. For a
more recent Pennsylvania expression of the view that marital status and
property rights should be separated, see Moser v. Granquist, 362 Pa. 302,
309, 66 A.2d 267, 270 (1949) (dissenting opinion of Jones, J.).
50. Grimm v. Grimm, 42 C. 685, 689, 24 Dist. 90, 93 (Pa. 1914).
51. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McVay, 383 Pa. 70, 118 A.2d 144 (1955).
If the Federal Constitution art. 4, § 1 requires that the Nevada de-
cree be recognized in this commonwealth, respondent's obligation
to support his wife ceased automatically when the divorce was
granted; conversely, if the constitutional mandate of full faith
and credit does not compel such recognition the support order con-
tinued in force and the judgment for the arrears was properly es-
tablished.
Id. at 72, 118 A.2d at 146.
52. Hudson v. Hudson, 52 Cal. App. 2d 735, 344 P.2d 295, 297 (1959).
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ex parte divorce procured by her husband cannot deprive her of
whatever rights to support she possessed under the law of her
domicile at the time when she was divorced. This view is predi-
cated on the principle that support rights are not necessarily ex-
tinguished by the mere termination of the marital status, as con-
trasted with the traditional Pennsylvania view that the right to
support is merely an incident of the marital relationship and
hence extinguished when that relationship is dissolved. 3 rt is
suggested that even without relying upon the due process clause
the Pennsylvania courts could have looked to the centuries old
precedents upon which their divorce-support policies are based
and drawn therefrom the conception that marital status and rights
of support are distinct entities. Even in medieval England it was
possible that a man and woman could be considered simultane-
ously married and unmarried, depending upon what tribunal was
adjudicating the question and for what purpose it was being ad-
judicated.54 It was in the temporal courts of that era that ques-
tions of dower and inheritance were decided, and there existed
circumstances in which the decisions of the temporal courts regard-
ing right to dower flew in the face of the determination of marital
status by the ecclesiastical courts.55
Because of Pennsylvania's pre-Stambaugh position that a valid
foreign ex parte divorce terminated support rights, the Pennsyl-
Hudson would appear to be the leading case propounding the due process
argument to this extent. Traynor, J., in the opinion of the court draws upon
the in rem-in personam analysis, noting that a foreign forum has the
authority to adjudicate the status (in rem) of one served constructively,
provided the forum possesses jurisdiction over the other spouse, but that it
has no power to adjudicate the property rights (in personam) of the ab-
sent spouse who was not personally served in the foreign state and who
does not appear in the action. Id. at 742-43, 344 P.2d at 299.
53. 3 FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 1332.
54. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENCLIsH LAW 374
(2d ed. 1909).
55. Id. From the middle of the twelfth century until the Council of
Trent (1545-1563), the church did not view a religious ceremony or the
presence of a priest as an absolute prerequisite to the formation of a valid
marriage. Although marrying without benefit of clergy necessitated the
imposition of penance and the subsequent blessing of the union by an
ordained cleric, the ecclesiastical courts nevertheless viewed the couple
as "married already when they exchanged a consent . . . or became one
flesh after exchanging a consent." Id. at 373. The temporal courts, how-
ever, stipulated that no woman could claim dower unless she had been
endowed at the church door, even though the fact of her marriage could not
be gainsaid. The most obvious contrast to the church-door marriage was the
death-bed marriage where "the sinner 'makes an honest woman' of his
mistress. This may do well enough for the church . . . but it must give
no rights in English soil." Id. at 375.
vania courts possessed but one method for preserving a mainte-
nance judgment for the spouse, namely finding grounds for declar-
ing the foreign divorce invalid. Prior to Williams 158 the state en-
countered no difficulty, as it simply refused to honor ex parte
foreign divorces.5 7 Whereas Williams I required each state to ac-
cord prima facie validity to a foreign decree,58 Williams II held
that the presumption was rebuttable,5 9 and Pennsylvania became
known for its tendency to subject sister state ex parte divorces to
extreme scrutiny.60 Accordingly, the Pennsylvania courts did not
deem the filling of the minimum residence requirements of the
foreign forum to be sufficient to sustain the presumption of valid-
ity.61 Pennsylvania exacted as a further requisite of valid foreign
jurisdiction not only the intent of the divorcing party to stay, but
also the fact that he did stay, in the purported new domicile after
the decree was granted
62
56. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
57. For the basis of this Pennsylvania position see note 19 supra.
58. 317 U.S. 287, 295 (1942).
59. 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945).
60. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McVay, 383 Pa. 70, 118 A.2d 144 (1955).
In McVay the wife obtained an Allegheny County support order in 1946.
In January 1949 the husband went to Las Vegas, Nevada, and was granted
a divorce by the Nevada courts in April of that year. Service on the wife
was made by publication, but she did not enter an appearance. Following
the Nevada decree the divorced husband discontinued support payments.
In January 1950 he moved to California where he still resided at the time
of the 1955 litigation brought by the wife for recovery of the unremitted
support payments. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accorded no weight to
the fact that the husband had severed all ties with Pennsylvania. The
court noted that his motive in going to Nevada had been to obtain the
divorce, and while reciting the fact that motive is not conclusive of the
question the court was nevertheless preoccupied with that consideration.
(See Foster, Domestic Relations, 18 U. Pinr. L. REV. 382, 392-93 (1957),
wherein this undue dwelling upon motive is criticized). The court found
that there was sufficient basis for overcoming the prima facie assumption
of validity of the foreign action even though the husband had gone to
Nevada with the intent of acquiring a domicile there. This they did by
reasoning that "the intention required for the acquisition of a domicile is
not to acquire the domicile but to make a home in fact." Id. at 75, 118
A.2d at 147.
61. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Esenwein, 348 Pa. 455, 35 A.2d 335,
affd, 325 U.S. 279 (1944). In Esenwein the husband went to Nevada at
the end of June 1941, lived in a hotel, was divorced September 8, 1941, and
left Nevada immediately afterwards to take up residence in Ohio. Al-
though the husband testified that he had gone to Nevada with the intention
of becoming a domiciliary of that jurisdiction, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court observed that "[his acts spoke louder than his words" and found
that he had no intention of making his domicile in Nevada. Id. at 458, 35
A.2d at 336.
62. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lorusso, 189 Pa. Super. 403, 150 A.2d
370 (1959), in which the Pennsylvania Superior Court'did find the requisite
domiciliary intent and thus cut off support rights of the spouse. In Lorusso
a Pennsylvania physician arrived in Nevada on January 24, 1957, and on
March 8, 1957, almost immediately after fulfilling the residence require-
ment, filed for divorce, which was granted April 2, 1957. After that time,
however, he continued to live in Nevada, establishing practice and still re-
maining there at the time the contest of the divorce decree was filed three
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It is noteworthy that Stambaugh seems to have presented cir-
cumstances in which the allegation of the husband's foreign domi-
cile was sufficiently vulnerable that, had the court been so dis-
posed, it could have overcome the prima facie assumption of the
jurisdiction of the divorce granting forum. In the court's own
words, "The record of this case is replete with indicia that the
appellant's domicile might be that of Florida or of Pennsylvania. '68
Furthermore, the lower Pennsylvania court had determined that
full faith and credit did not have to be accorded the Florida di-
vorce since the husband was not domiciled in Florida.64 The
Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that it "would not disturb the
fact-finder's conclusion as to domicile where there is a hodge podge
of conflicting intangibles. "15 Yet, with only a mere rehearsal of
the factors favoring each side of the argument the court proceeded
to invoke the doctrine of the presumptive validity of a foreign di-
vorce and announced that the appellee had not met her burden of
establishing lack of Florida jurisdiction, so that the foreign divorce
would be given full faith and credit.66 This summary handling
of the domicile-jurisdiction question contrasts markedly with the
extensive discussion accorded the problem in many other Penn-
sylvania appellate decisions.67
years later. It should be noted that although his duties to support his
former wife in accordance with a prior Pennsylvania decree were termi-
nated by the foreign divorce, the physician was not entitled to have re-
mitted the arrearages which had accumulated under the support order prior
to the date of the divorce. Id. at 415, 150 A.2d at 377.
63. 222 Pa. Super. 360, 362, 294 A.2d 817, 818 (1972). The brief for
the appellant husband stresses the fact that he purchased $60,000 worth
of Florida property to serve as a residence, affiliated with a church and
clubs in Florida, registered his car there, was enrolled on the voting lists of
that state, and had his passport issued to a Florida address. Brief for Ap-
pellant at 3-4, Stambaugh v. Stambaugh, 222 Pa. Super. 360, 294 A.2d 817
(1972). The brief for the appellee wife emphasizes that the appellant told
his business associate that he was going to Florida to develop the necessary
indicia of residency to qualify for a Florida divorce, that within a few days
after obtaining his Florida divorce decree the appellant returned to Penn-
sylvania to live in an apartment on which he had recently obtained a one
year lease, that he was actually living in Pennsylvania a substantial part
of the time during which he was supposed to be a Florida domiciliary, and
that he filed his personal income tax return in Philadelphia, rather than in
Florida. Brief for Appellee at 20-21, Stambaugh v. Stambaugh, 222 Pa.
Super. 360, 294 A.2d 817 (1972).
64. Stambaugh v. Stambaugh, 222 Pa. Super. 360, 363, 294 A.2d 817, 818
(1972).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 363, 294 A.2d at 819.
67. See, e.g., In re Estate of March,'426 Pa. 364, 231 A.2d 168 (1967);
Commonwealth v. McVay, 383 Pa. 70, 118 A.2d 144 (1955); Commonwealth
v. Esenwein, 348 Pa. 455, 35 A.2d 335 (1944); Commonwealth v. Lorusso,
189 Pa. Super. 403, 150 A.2d 370 (1959).
In addition to Stambaugh's uncharacteristic approach to the
domicile-jurisdiction issue, its treatment of the doctrine of divisi-
ble divorce is also unconventional. At the outset of its analysis
of this question, the court properly notes that permanent support
is the characteristic feature of divorce am.e.t.68 The court subse-
quently interjects the issue of whether a valid foreign ex parte
divorce must terminate rights of support in the same manner as
would a divorce av.m. granted by a Pennsylvania court. At that
juncture, unfortunately, the force of the court's opinion is blunted
by its unexplained manner of citing the Divorce Act of 1929.69 The
court quotes from a wording which was eliminated in 1959 rather
than from the current amended version which was enacted in
the latter year.70 Following this, the court invokes the Estin
principle of divisible divorce, making no mention of Pennsylvania's
prior emphatic holdings that Estin does not apply in that state.71
The court then distinguishes Commonwealth v. Lorusso,72 in which
it was held that an ex parte absolute divorce of a sister state termi-
nated rights of support which had accrued in Pennsylvania.73 The
distinction is not made, however, on the basis of factual differ-
ences or statutory enactments or Supreme Court holdings subse-
quent to Lorusso, but on the novel ground that in the Lorusso ap-
peal neither the opinion of the court nor the briefs of counsel re-
ferred to the doctrine of divisible divorce.14  The court offers no
explanation of how the mere citing of Estin in the briefs of coun-
sel in Stambaugh can be parlayed into an adoption of the Es-
tin doctrine of divisible divorce in 1972 when in 1949 the same
68. Stambaugh v. Stambaugh, 222 Pa. Super. 360, 363, 294 A.2d 817,
819 (1972).
69. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 1-69 (1955).
70. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 55 (1972).
71. Commonwealth v. McCormack, 164 Pa. Super. 553, 557, 67 A.2d
603, 605 (1949). It should be noted that even prior to Stambaugh Penn-
sylvania courts had not been entirely adverse to applying the Estin rationale
when discussing the necessity for personal jurisdiction in adjudicating in
personam matters. In 1960 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court allowed its
cognizance of Estin to slip into open view in Commonwealth v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 400 Pa. 337, 162 A.2d 617 (1960). In that case the
Commonwealth successfully brought action against a utility for the escheat
of moneys which had been deposited with the defendant and left unclaimed
for the statutory period. In reaching its decisions, the court built upon
Estin but did not cite it directly. Instead, it placed, as it were, a buffer
between itself and Estin by citing a portion of the opinion in Standard Oil
Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951), in which the United States Supreme
Court had quoted Estin for the principle that since choses in action have
no special or tangible existence, control over them can "only arise from
control or power over the persons whose relationships are the source of
the rights and obligations." Commonwealth v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 400 Pa. 337, 343, 162 A.2d 617, 620 (1960), citing Standard Oil Co. v.
New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951), citing Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 548
(1948).
72. 189 Pa. Super. 403, 150 A.2d 370 (1959).
73. Id. at 406, 150 A.2d at 372.




Pennsylvania Superior Court explicitly dealt with Estin in Com-
monwealth v. McCormack5 and quite understandably did not al-
low Estin to control its decision by the mere fact of its being men-
tioned in the McCormack opinion.
With the rationale of the Stambaugh decision so unclear, 'the
scope which it will be accorded in future Pennsylvania litigation
concerning foreign ex parte divorces necessarily remains uncer-
tain. Future decisions may seize upon the fact that Stambaugh
involved the question of the termination of alimony previously
granted in the course of a Pennsylvania divorce am.e.t. and thus
limit the holding to cases involving similar am.e.t. support orders
rather than extending the Stambaugh holding to protect the rights
of women whose divorce in ex parte foreign proceedings was not
preceded by a Pennsylvania bed and board divorce and mainte-
nance decree. If this limited applicability of the Stambaugh hold-
ing is adopted by the Pennsylvania courts, it would be in line with
the policy recently developed by Maryland, which like Pennsyl-
vania had traditionally refused to allow support rights to survive
an ex parte divorce of a sister state.71 In Dackman v. Dackman,
77
however, the Court of Appeals of Maryland noted its traditional
position, but nevertheless invoked its equity powers to award sup-
port payments even though a Nevada decree had previously been
awarded the husband.78 Subsequent Maryland decisions have re-
fused to allow Dackman to be applied to circumstances beyond
those of the "innocent wife" to whom support is awarded out of
the sequestered or attached property within the jurisdiction.79
Despite the opportunities which Stambaugh provides for its
close construction, the opinion contains a hint that the court may
in the future be willing to expand rather than confine the cir-
cumstances under which it will allow a spouse to receive support
from her divorced husband following an ex parte foreign decree.
The muted suggestion appears in the cases which Stambaugh cites
as being in accord with Estin. Among those mentioned is Vander-
bilt v. Vanderbilt80 Vanderbilt reached the Supreme Court fol-
75. 164 Pa. Super. 553, 557, 67 A.2d 267, 270 (1949).
76. See, e.g., Brewster v. Brewster, 204 Md. 501, 105 A.2d 232 (1954).
77. 252 Md. 331, 250 A.2d 60 (1969).
78. Id.at 346, 250 A.2d at 67. The classification of decrees of alimony
as within the jurisdiction of equity has been questioned. See, e.g., CLARK,
supra note 30, at 421, where such classification is regarded as a misreading
of English legal history, since alimony was the exclusive province of the
English ecclesiastical courts, rather than being within the scope of equity.
79. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 11 Md. App. 396, 399, 274 A.2d 652 (1971);
Blumenthal v. Blumenthal, 258 Md. 534, 539, 266 A.2d 337 (1970).
80. 334 U.S. 416 (1957).
lowing the husband's procuring of a Nevada divorce and the di-
vorced wife's obtaining a New York support order subsequent to
the Nevada decree. Although the Court noted that the facts of
Vanderbilt were distinguishable from Estin in that in the former
case the wife's right to support had not been reduced to judgment
prior to the husband's ex parte foreign divorce,"' it found that the
difference was not material under the circumstances sub judice.8 2
Consequently, the Court held that since the wife was not subject
to Nevada jurisdiction, Nevada possessed no power to extinguish
any rights to financial support from her husband which the wife
enjoyed under the law of New York. 3
It is suggested that in Stambaugh the court has wisely
changed its position regarding divisible divorce. The decision
should be welcomed despite the imprecision of its analysis and the
uncertainty of the scope which it will be accorded in future Penn-
sylvania decisions. Without the advantage of the doctrine of di-
visible divorce a Pennsylvania spouse was often provided with no
satisfactory recourse if her husband sued for a foreign divorce.
If she entered an appearance, all actions that could have been de-
termined in the proceeding would be regarded as res judicata so
that there was the possibility that her support rights would be
cut off even when the question of maintenance was not raised. If,
on the other hand, she did not enter an appearance, her home state
would refuse to allow her to assert that she possessed any support
rights to be protected by the principles of due process. The only
possibility remaining would be for her to establish domicile in
some other state more receptive to her predicament, but such a
move could very likely entail counterbalancing difficulties. To
solve this problem Stambaugh has offered the Pennsylvania spouse
greater protection from financial embarrassment and has also
eliminated a vestige of interstate turmoil which has been viewed
as unnecessary by the great majority of American jurisdictions.
JFmF L. HocK
81. Id. at 418.
82. Id.
83. Id.
